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Abstract
Between 2012 and 2018, Spanish public opinion has been shaken by a seemingly endless series of corruption scandals,
to the point that corruption has become one of the main long-term concerns of the Spanish population, according to
nation-wide surveys. Despite the sharp rise in corruption scandals within local authorities, there are Spanish cities that
have managed to limit corruption and build a transparent and efficient government, which stand out as islands of integrity
and good governance. This article qualitatively investigates two cities in Spain—Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès—
which, despite being in a region with comparatively lower quality of government, have managed to successfully control
corruption. We argue that the key to success is the administrative reorganization prompted by the appointment of city
managers that institutionalized professional management. Findings also have implications for practitioners, meaning that
complex anti-corruption legislative frameworks will not work within an overburdened administration unless the adminis-
trative structure is reformed.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, interest in anticorruption has
gained a global dimension through the signing of multi-
ple international conventions and the emergence of a se-
ries of transnational actors (UN, OECD, Council of Europe,
European Commission, and Transparency International,
among the others). Anticorruption has become an in-
dustry (Sampson, 2010), meaning that there is a mar-
ketplace of initiatives, organized and prioritized by in-
ternational organizations acting like ‘integrity warriors’
with considerable resources and policy reach (de Sousa,
Hindess, & Larmour, 2009). The recommendations is-
sued by these actors and their monitoring of national
anti-corruption measures have been focused on a ‘le-
gal toolbox,’ which primes certain tools such as whistle-
blower protection, conflict of interest regulation, staff ro-
tation, lobbying for transparency, and so forth. Yet, the
most common measures recommended in the current
international anti-corruption toolkit have not proved to
be effective in reducing corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi &
Dadašov, 2017).
This finding suggests looking at anti-corruption tools
in a broader context by taking specific institutional di-
mensions into account. In the absence of a number of
empowering institutional factors, the set of specific le-
gal instruments promoted by the international integrity
warriors is not likely to work (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dadašov,
2016). Our research focuses on professional bureaucra-
cies, which have long been recognized as an important
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institutional factor in curbing corruption (Rauch & Evans,
2000). Yet, we lack empirical studies that explore the
ways through which administrative reforms can enhance
the professionalism of bureaucracy. In particular, re-
search on institutional factors that support control of cor-
ruption at the local level of government remains sparse
(Beeri & Navot, 2013).
We address this gap in the literature by analysing
the administrative reforms in two Spanish municipalities.
The implementation of these reforms represents two ‘is-
lands of good government’ in a country that is marked
by widespread corruption at the local level (Jiménez,
Villoria, & Quesada-Garcia, 2012). Previous research on
corruption in Spanish municipalities highlighted the role
of political stability as a factor that may explain varia-
tion in corruption practices (Jiménez, Quesada-Garcia, &
Villoria, 2014). This finding is not consistent with most
of the comparative literature on anticorruption reform,
which argued that incentives for the implementation of
anti-corruption reforms are generated by sustained polit-
ical competition (Schnell, 2018). To address this inconsis-
tency, we identify under what conditions a low level of
political competition may support the launch and imple-
mentation of reform initiatives to raise the level of pro-
fessionalism in local bureaucracies.
In doing so, we draw on two strands of literature.
First, we build on those few studies in the field of political
science, which highlight the virtuous circles activated by
the duration of political leadership; second, we build on
those accounts of public management reform that con-
sider micro-level factors, that is changes at the level of
individual organizations (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008). The fo-
cus on micro-level factors allows for variation across in-
dividual organizations at the subnational level in coun-
tries that are marked by the existence of a larger, macro
institutional framework which acts as a barrier to the
implementation of reform. More specifically, our find-
ings verymuch support previous research suggesting the
importance of leadership by city managers for the suc-
cessful implementation of reform in local government
(Nalbandian, 2006; Nelson & Svara, 2015).
The remainder of the article unfolds as follows. In
the next section, we provide more detail on our theo-
retical framework. Then, we present the background of
this study, namely the institutional patterns of Spanish
local government. We outline the case selection strategy
and methodology before tracking the progress of public
management reform in two municipalities, Alcobendas
and Sant Cugat del Vallès, which stand out for their suc-
cess in administrative modernization. Finally, we discuss
our findings and consider their implications for both re-
searchers and practitioners.
2. Theoretical Argument
Our research focuses on the control of corruption, un-
derstood as the equilibrium between the opportuni-
ties for corruption (power discretion and resources)
and the deterrents imposed by the state and soci-
ety (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). In past decades, the ef-
fort to control corruption by curbing opportunities and
strengthening legal and normative constraints has grown
exponentially worldwide. Still, there seem to be few suc-
cessful cases where anti-corruption programmes have
been effectively implemented. For a growing number
of scholars, the failure of anti-corruption initiatives lies
in the inappropriate theoretical foundations that in-
form their design. Anticorruption efforts are influenced
mainly by principal–agent approaches which assume
that corruption is solvable with policies to reinforce
transparency, monitoring, and sanctioning of public offi-
cials who manage public resources. Critics have argued
that this assumption is flawed, especially in contexts
ridden with systemic corruption where collective action
problems hinder the implementation of anti-corruption
interventions (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013, 2019).
However, Marquette and Peiffer (2019) and others high-
lighted that collective action approach does not help anti-
corruption practitioners decide what to do differently,
or how. The anti-corruption field has suffered from the
quest for one overarching theory whereas researchers
and practitioners should pay more attention to the focus
and locus of corruption, that is the different types and
contexts in which corruption occurs (Heywood, 2017).
The article joins the call for research underscoring
targeted interventions as it focuses on appropriate con-
texts, where political will is available to implement the in-
stitutional fixes needed to curb corruption (Marquette &
Peiffer, 2018). The starting point of our research is the es-
tablished institutionalist approach to good governance,
which emphasises the role of professional bureaucracies
in reducing the risks of corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente,
& Teorell, 2012). The expectation from this approach is
that in cases where bureaucrats are agents of their polit-
ical principals, they do not inhibit politicians’ opportunis-
tic actions. Conversely, in cases where bureaucrats act as
‘trustees,’ they keep politicians’ abuse and misbehaviour
in check. This approach draws on the agent–fiduciary
dichotomy developed by Majone (2001) who identified
two different logics of delegation: One logic is informed
by the demand for policy-relevant expertise, in which
political leaders delegate executive functions to agents
within relatively constraining control mechanisms; the
second logic is guided by the demand for credible com-
mitments, meaning that leaders deliberately insulate
their ‘trustees’ so that they may implement policies to
which their leaders could not credibly commit.
We focus on the fiduciary relationship between may-
ors and city managers in local government. In past
decades, the post of citymanager has been introduced in
the organizational charts ofmunicipalities acting as a cru-
cial link between elected officials and city departments
(Klausen & Magnier, 1998; Sancino & Turrini, 2009). City
managers are focused on the organization they lead
and they consistently allocate most of their time and
energy to building organizational capacity (van Dorp,
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2018). They are receptive to administrative reform since
it has a positive impact on their ability to manage ef-
fectively. Thus, they are a vital cog in their organiza-
tions for launching and enacting administrative reform,
increasingly through strategic management (Mitchell,
2018). This strand of literature on city managers as pol-
icy change agents leads us to expect that local govern-
ments led by them should display a greater propensity
towards the implementation of those institutions (merit-
based human resource policy, rules and standard oper-
ating procedures, transparency and independent watch-
dogs) that increase the accountability of political actors
and limit their discretion over state resources (Knott &
Miller, 2008; Miller &Whitford, 2016). Drawing on these
expectations, previous studies have found a positive ef-
fect of city managers on the local government trans-
parency and performance (Drapalova & Lapuente, 2017;
Fay & Zavattaro, 2019).
The establishment of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween mayors and city managers makes it more diffi-
cult for political leaders to benefit from the control of
resources and any lack of accountability. A fiduciary re-
lationship may lead leaders to a complete and, in some
cases, an irrevocable transfer of their political property
rights in a given area in favour of their trustee. These
features make political leaders reluctant to establish a
fiduciary relationship with the city managers. However,
a recent strand of literature has underlined that political
competition can create conditions in which political lead-
ers see, not only the potential costs of but also benefits
from the launch of reforms (Berliner, 2014).
Political competition has long been recognized by re-
search on patronage and corruption as a key factor in-
fluencing political incentives for opportunistic behaviour.
According to this strand of research, political leaderswho
are electorally secure and who face weak opposition will
have no incentive to curb corruption (Grzymała-Busse,
2007). Hence, political competition moderates the be-
haviour of leaders who fear punishment from voters
in upcoming elections. Anticipating this effect, incum-
bents will abstain from corruption and put reforms into
operation to ‘signal’ their competence and integrity
(Bågenholm & Charron, 2014). Furthermore, political
competition induces political leaders to launch reforms
when faced with electoral uncertainty (Berliner & Erlich,
2015). If incumbents suspect that they are likely to lose
power, they have a strong incentive to place the burden
resulting from the implementation of reforms onto the
shoulders of their political opponents.
Research has also argued that low political competi-
tion at the municipal level creates ‘entrenched parties’
able to restrict public procurement processes (Broms,
Dahlström, & Fazekas, 2019; Coviello & Gagliarducci,
2017). The same argument has been applied to the
study of transparency at the municipal level (Bearfield
& Bowman, 2017). Transparency is expected to in-
crease when electoral competition becomes ‘fiercer’
(Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero, 2012), though recent re-
search failed to support the hypothesis that increased
electoral pressure over the local executive enhances in-
formation disclosure (Tejedo-Romero & Araujo, 2020). In
particular, Tavares and da Cruz (2017) found the exact op-
posite,meaning that lowpolitical competitionmay deter-
mine higher levels of transparency, pointing to the idea
that political stability may well be a precondition for ad-
equate governance.
For the purposes of this article, we narrow down the
scope of political stability to government longevity, that
is the number of consecutive terms served by incum-
bents (Dowding & Kimber, 1983). In the field of public
administration, the study of the effects of political sta-
bility is an emerging field of inquiry (Mele & Ongaro,
2014). Research on the management of EU cohesion
funds has highlighted that those parties which alternate
in control of government change implementation priori-
ties according to their preferences. These changes inter-
rupt implementation and weaken capacities (Hagemann,
2019; Milio, 2008; Piattoni & Smyrl, 2002). Nationwide
examination of public management reform has also high-
lighted that the continuity of incumbents favours the co-
herence and regularity ofmanagement over themedium
to long-term, as is needed, to be able to put in place
fundamental, wide-ranging reforms (Pollitt & Bouckaert,
2014). By explicitly considering the effects of rapid and
short political punctuation on public management re-
form (Pollitt, 2008), this research has highlighted that
discontinuity of incumbents exacerbates policy-makers’
natural disregard for the operational aspects of imple-
mentation. Conversely, durability supports the expecta-
tion that reforms will be maintained, thus sustaining
the prolonged investment of resources in reform imple-
mentation at the operational level. This leads policy en-
trepreneurs such as city managers to engage in a pat-
tern of implementation effort consistent with their pro-
fessional aspirations and responsibilities (Di Mascio &
Natalini, 2013; Ramió & Salvador, 2012).
To recap, different strands of literature highlight dif-
ferent effects of political competition on reforms. On the
one hand, political competition provides incentives to
signal a credible commitment to bring about change. On
the other hand, the longevity of incumbents provides the
luxury of long-term horizons that sustain the implemen-
tation of wide-ranging reforms. All this suggests that gov-
ernment longevity does not necessarily hinder effective
anticorruption reform efforts but in fact, might sustain
it under certain circumstances. The following empirical
analysis is devoted to the identification of such circum-
stances in the Spanish context in which the fiduciary re-
lationship between mayors and city managers has not
been part of the administrative tradition (Mouritzen &
Svara, 2012). This feature of the Spanish administrative
tradition makes the analysis of cases in which delegation
of powers to citymanagers has led to broad scope reform
particularly interesting.
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3. Spanish Context
Between 2012 and 2018, Spanish public opinion was
shaken by a seemingly endless series of corruption scan-
dals, to the point that corruption has nowbecome one of
the main long-term concerns of the Spanish population
(European Commission, 2014). Hundreds of corruption
charges were filed across the country. A large proportion
of those charges involved numerous mayors, local politi-
cians, and civil servants (Jiménez et al., 2012). The litera-
ture generally highlights urban planning and public pro-
curement as the policy areas most vulnerable to corrup-
tion (Jiménez, 2009; Jiménez, Villoria, & Romero, 2012).
The existing accounts of corruption in Spain under-
line a combination of factors that drive the higher oc-
currence of corrupt practices at the local level. These
include the structural problem of capacity gaps result-
ing from the small size of Spanish municipalities, the
lack of structures for effectively enforcing the high num-
ber of regulations, the low effectiveness of checks and
balances in relation to public spending, and the strong-
mayor form of local government and discretionary pow-
ers associatedwith it (Martín&Darias, 2011). The strong-
mayor type is based on the principle of individualized po-
litical leadership by Spanish mayors. The latter are not
directly elected, but theymust be the head of a party list.
The extent of scrutiny of the performance of local govern-
ment by the council tends to be limited and elections are
widely regarded as contests between competing candi-
dates for the position ofmayor (Sweeting, 2012). As head
of staff, the typical Spanish mayor is closely involved in
running and managing the local government. The may-
oral powers of appointment are considerable and they
are often used to intervene and act in the organization
and operation of municipal organizations (Salvador &
Pano, 2018).
The organizational development of municipalities
has been shaped by national legislation that stipulates a
set of positions such as the Chief Administrative Officers,
who are civil servants with a professional national qualifi-
cation, and who tend to conform to the role of a classical
bureaucrat with a low political profile. They still have a le-
galist background and they can be seen to represent the
Napoleonic administrative tradition. In Spain, the admin-
istrative systemdoes not foresee a separation ofmanage-
ment and politics such as in the UK, Sweden, or the US
(Mouritzen & Svara, 2012). However, in some larger local
authorities, city managers have been appointed as offi-
cials versed with and committed to modern New Public
Management techniques and skills (Wollmann, 2012). To
be considered a city manager, two conditions have to be
fulfilled. Firstly, the city manager should occupy a posi-
tion of hierarchical superiority to the other civil servants
who should report to them. Secondly, municipal finances
and budget, general services, personnel hiring, and in-
formation systems should be under their direct control
and supervision (Fernandez, 2013). City managers’ pri-
mary responsibilities are to introduce efficiency in the
local management and make sure that the strategies de-
vised by politicians are executed and evaluated.
4. Case Selection Strategy and Methodology
Our analysis is based on a qualitative comparative case
study of two Spanish cities that present above-average
levels of transparency and administrative capacity de-
spite being located in regions with numerous corrup-
tion scandals and low-quality regional government as in-
dicated by the European Quality of Government Index
(Charron, Lapuente, & Annoni, 2019). These pockets of
good government are Alcobendas in Madrid and Sant
Cugat del Vallès in Catalonia. Spain provides an ideal set-
ting to examine the factors that affect control of local cor-
ruption because of the tremendous subnational variation
and the presence of citieswith remarkably different levels
of performance (Parrado, Dahlström, & Lapuente, 2018).
Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès share many
similarities in the setup of their organisation, political
competition, and socioeconomic composition. Both are
medium-sized cities, resourceful but with a high level
of inequality, with a similar economic model, and a
strong business sector. They stand in stark contrast to
their medium-sized neighbouring cities as they were
not targeted by corruption investigations. In 2009 the
Pretoria scandal uncovered corruption related to plan-
ning issues linked to politicians of the Catalan Socialist
Party (Partit Socialista de Catalunya) in medium-sized
cities such as Santa Coloma de Gramenet and Badalona.
In 2014, the mayors of two medium-sized municipalities
in the Madrid region, Parla and Valdemoro, were hit by
the Púnica scandal as a part of graft investigation involv-
ing local government construction contracts.
The four cities hit by corruption scandals shared two
features. First, a stable area of professional manage-
ment had not become institutionalized in these munic-
ipalities through the introduction of a city manager be-
fore the eruption of corruption scandals. Second, the po-
litical environment was marked by a low level of com-
petitiveness. In both Badalona and Santa Coloma de
Gramenet, the Catalan Socialist Party had been in power
since 1979 until the eruption of the Pretoria scandal;
in Parla, the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista
Obrero Español) had been in power since 1979 until the
eruption of the Púnica scandal; the latter hit Valdemoro
which had been managed by the Popular Party (Partido
Popular) since 1999. These four cases, therefore, pro-
vide support for the argument that low political compe-
tition is detrimental to corruption control. Yet, this argu-
ment does not hold for Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del
Vallès which were not hit by corruption scandals despite
the low level of competitiveness of their political envi-
ronment. In Alcobendas, the Popular Party had been in
power from 2007 to 2019 after 24 years of Socialist gov-
ernment whereas in Sant Cugat del Vallès the Catalan na-
tionalist party Convergence and Union (Convergència i
Unió) had been in power from 1987 to 2019.
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The lack of sustained political competition in
Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès has also been as-
sociated with a high level of transparency, an indicator
that signals the control of corruption (Benito, Guillamón,
& Bastida, 2015). Transparency has also been put at
the centre of the anticorruption packages adopted by
Spanish governments as a reaction to widespread judi-
cial investigations into local corruption (Villoria, 2020).
If we take data on the quality of information available
on the municipal websites, Alcobendas and Sant Cugat
del Vallès, in 2014, scored 88 and 98 respectively out
of 100, outclassing Badalona, Valdemoro, and Parla,
which ranged from 48 to 56. Data were collected by the
University of Barcelona and contain an index made up
of 52 different components adapted from the national
transparency law in 2013 (InfoParticipa, 2017). We have
selected this indicator because it covers a large number
of Spanish municipalities. Alcobendas and Sant Cugat
del Vallès also exhibited a good level of administrative
capacity as revealed by indicators that measure the abil-
ity of Spanish municipalities to speed up tax collection
and payments to providers in 2014. As shown by Table 1,
the transparency and administrative capacity gap be-
tween ‘good’ (Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès)
and ‘rotten’ apples (Parla, Valdemoro, Santa Coloma de
Gramenet, Badalona) has further increased in the period
from 2014 to 2017.
The next empirical section unveils how the appoint-
ment of city managers—a key institutional feature that
distinguished the ‘good’ from the ‘rotten’ apples—set
in motion a sequence of administrative reforms that
shielded the well-performing cities from corruption in-
vestigations as well as improving levels of transparency
and administrative capacity. The framing of our quali-
tative study connects the research question to broader
theoretical conversations in the field (Ospina, Esteve, &
Lee, 2017). More specifically, we apply what Ashworth,
McDermott, and Currie (2019) call ‘abductive method’
that starts with formulating an empirical puzzle and com-
bines inductive and deductive approaches to solve it. We
rely on case study research that allows us to explain why
we observe particular relationships and which can help
us to clarify gaps and inconsistencies in theory (Rubin &
Baker, 2019; Yin, 2014). We employ process tracing that
involves the careful use of evidence for the identification
of sequences linking contexts and outcomes (Bennett
& Checkel, 2014; George & Bennett, 2005). The subna-
tional approach allows us to hold macro-conditions—
such as national regime type and institutional setting—
constant. In contrast, the specific factors that this theory
considers relevant to the level of corruption are allowed
to vary (Snyder, 2001).
The empirical analysis is based on press reports,
documents provided by both city halls and administra-
tions, archival research, secondary literature, public dec-
larations, as well as 25 interviews with local experts,
politicians, civil servants, activists, and business associa-
tion representatives, conducted between 2013 and 2015.
Interviews were based on a semi-structured question-
naire and partially transcribed and translated by one of
the authors. The questionnaires and the list of interviews
are available upon request. For each case, we outline the
main characteristic of local government and trace the
changes carried out on over the last two decades.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Alcobendas
Alcobendas is located in the Madrid Region which has
been deeply affected by corruption scandals. The best
known are theGürtel investigation, which engulfed three
mayors (Majadahonda, Boadilla del Monte, and Pozuelo
de Alarcón) and three former MPs of the regional par-
liament (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017), and the Púnica
scandal that embroiled six mayors (among others Parla,
Valdemoro, and Torrejón de Velasco) just within the
Madrid region. Over the last 50 years, Alcobendas has
grown from a small agrarian village to a thriving mid-
sized city with over 110,000 inhabitants. Once a dormi-
tory town, it has now developed into a business, indus-
trial, and service centre with low unemployment, high
levels of entrepreneurship, and a sizeable middle class.
Within the Madrid context, the trajectory of Alcobendas
is unique as city manager roles outside Catalonia are still
exceptional. Surrounding municipalities with similar po-
litical and economic characteristics that were involved
in the wave of corruption scandals during the Púnica
and Gürtel investigations have not adopted a city man-
ager structure.
While corruption scandals shook the surrounding
cities, Alcobendas collected international awards for ad-
ministrative innovation and good management. In 2016,
it was the first local government in Europe to be handed
Table 1. Transparency and administrative capacity in Spanish municipalities.
Indicators Alcobendas Parla Valdemoro Sant Cugat Santa Coloma Badalona
Transparency (2014) 87.8 56.1 53.66 97.56 95.12 47.9
Transparency (2017) 84.62 50 53.85 96.15 100 55.77
Tax collection (days, 2014) 51.55 73.88 59.98 40.33 66.81 48.07
Tax collection (days, 2017) 29.84 91.58 36.26 30.86 80.36 37.68
Payment to suppliers (days, 2017) 17 346 321 22 8 43
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with data from the Ministry of Finance of Spain (2017) and InfoParticipa (2017).
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the European Foundation for Quality Management ex-
cellence award that recognized the commitment to qual-
ity and continual improvement of public services. It was
also one of the Spanish cities that made information
available on their website before the adoption of the na-
tional transparency law in 2013. It ranked as one of the
most transparent cities in Spain according to the City Hall
Transparency Index as it scored 99 out of 100 against a na-
tional average of 70 in 2010. The City Hall Transparency
Index, developed by the Spanish chapter of Transparency
International, measures the level of transparency of the
110 largest Spanish City councils through an integrated
set of 80 indicators.
How did this ordinary city manage to maintain its
clean reputation and control opportunities for corrup-
tion effectively while other similar cities failed? The suc-
cess builds on a sequence of administrative reforms
set in motion during the last two mandates of the
Socialist politician José Caballerowho had beenmayor of
Alcobendas in the period 1983–2007. The first substan-
tial organisational change occurred between 1991–1995
when the executive created a Central Organisation and
Coordination Unit that implemented management by
objectives and adopted the first strategic plan (Iglesias
Alonso, 2006). This new unit was guaranteed the neces-
sary resources and it was put under the political lead-
ership of the deputy mayor. Subsequently, Alcobendas
had a consulting company evaluate and design a poten-
tial new organizational model. According to the former
mayor, the municipality was inspired by the spread of
the city manager structure in Catalonia. The new model
was based on the introduction of a dual organizational
structurewith the appointment of a citymanager as ‘gen-
eral coordinator’ in 1999 (Iglesias Alonso, 2006; Palacios,
Fulgueiras, & Catalina, 2002). As the former mayor of
Alcobendas declared:
Besides introducing new policies, we needed a shift
in the organization. The organization had remained
largely obsolete and we faced serious difficulties for-
mulating complex policies and long-term planning.
We needed a manager who would centralize and
coordinate projects. So, we tended towards a new
organizational model that delegated decision mak-
ing powers from the political to the managerial
level, ensuring the coordination between the pub-
lic and private sector in the management of devel-
opment projects. (Former mayor of Alcobendas, per-
sonal communication)
Thus, the organisational reform aimed to deliver public
services more effectively and improve internal control
and coordination within the administration. It has sep-
arated the political mandate and strategy from adminis-
trative direction and reinforced internal oversight and ex-
ternal accountability. A critical component of the reform
was the adoption of so-calledMunicipal Action Plans that
established themain guidelines andpriorities of the legis-
lature that determine the political communication strat-
egy, the budget, and the implementation (Iglesias Alonso
& Villoria, 2010). These Municipal Action Plans offered a
broad citywide accountability mechanism and they were
supported by the city manager because they limited the
discretion of both elected officials and public employees.
They also motivated the city manager to accomplish the
city’s priorities and demonstrate his own effectiveness as
leader of the managerial sphere.
The city manager had ties with the deputy mayor
and this reassured the mayor that the new administra-
tor was committed to accountability and political respon-
siveness. His previous experience in public management
made him knowledgeable about administrative reform
processes and this instilled respect for his administra-
tive competence in the eyes of the mayor. The city man-
ager engaged in a pattern of sustained effort consistent
with his responsibilities and previous experience and he
was also able to cultivate a relationship with the mayor
based on mutual respect. The effect of the constructive
relationship between political andmanagerial leadership
was strengthened by a number of new governance ar-
rangements. First, the city manager’s office was incorpo-
rated into the department of economy. With this move,
resources were expanded while enhancing coordination
capacity. Second, the oversight of hiring procedures was
entrusted to the citymanager to ensure the coherence of
personnel recruitment with the Municipal Action Plans.
Third, the city manager created a planning and evalua-
tion unit within his personal staff with the task of cen-
tralizing and coordinating data collection and analysis.
The development of governance arrangements ben-
efited from the strong support of the Socialist leadership
from 1995 to 2007, a period in which pursuit of com-
prehensive administrative modernization was a clear ob-
jective of the mayor. The interviews suggest that the
longevity of the Socialist leadership was an important
context factor for administrative reforms that needed a
prolonged period to be implemented effectively:
The critical element of the transformation was, in my
opinion, the political stability of themunicipal govern-
ment. We have had a strongly united group, without
internal divisions, a coherent team, that avoids wast-
ing time in internal wars and that facilitates the work
and increases our credibility….We had to show the
citizens that we do things, but not just by respond-
ing [to their requests], we had to be able to foresee
[their requests] in advance. We had to be one step
ahead of them. (Former mayor of Alcobendas, per-
sonal communication)
Nevertheless, government longevity did not mean that
the incumbents did not face any electoral pressure. In
1995, the Popular Partywon inMadrid’s regional election
as well as in many surrounding cities previously held by
the Spanish Socialist Party. The decreasing electoral sup-
port for the Spanish Socialist Party in the region pushed
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the incumbent mayor to showcase himself as a good ad-
ministrator in a context where the regional government
and the large majority of surrounding cities were un-
der the control of the Popular Party. This set in motion
the transformation of the governance structure. The im-
plementation process was effective enough to protect
the city manager structure from the potential effects of
government alternation that occurred in 2007 when the
Popular Party won the majority in the local elections.
Positive perceptions about the tangible results of the
organizational model implemented under the Socialist
leadership provided further impetus for the refinement
of the administrative reform policy under the leadership
of the new mayor, Ignacio Garcia Vinuesa, who did not
remove the city manager he inherited from the outgoing
government. The new political leadership, thus, took ad-
vantage of the citymanager’s competence, ensuring that
the shift in political control did not mean an interruption
of the administrative reform, which continued under the
leadership of the city manager who ran the municipality
from 1999 until 2015.
5.2. Sant Cugat del Vallès
With a population of roughly 100,000 inhabitants, this
bedroom community was once a small agrarian village
that has undergone vertiginous growth since 1980 due to
suburbanization from Barcelona and immigration. After
rapid modernization, the main economic activity is now
in the service sector, telecommunications, and construc-
tion. Within the Catalan context, Sant Cugat del Vallès
is a city with above-average performance in terms of ad-
ministrative performance. Like in the case of Alcobendas,
several national and international awards attest the qual-
ity of public services. In 2009, Sant Cugat del Vallès
was the final winner in the European Public Sector
Award theme ‘Leadership and Management for Change.’
In 2010, the Agency for Evaluation and Quality of the
Spanish Ministry of Finance recognized the city reform
program with the seal of good practices in internal man-
agement. In 2010, the municipality also achieved the
highest score of 100 in the City Hall Transparency Index.
Sant Cugat del Vallès has been governed for al-
most two decades by the conservative nationalist party
Convergence and Union. It was a federation of two
constituent parties, the larger Democratic Convergence
of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya)
and the smaller Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió
Democràtica de Catalunya). It dissolved in 2015 and this
enabled the left-wing independentist Republican Left of
Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) party to
take over in Sant Cugat in 2019. In 1987, for the first
time, Convergence and Union won the local election in
Sant Cugat with an ample majority, and Joan Aymerich
Aroca became mayor of the largest city governed solely
by Convergence and Union. During the following years,
the city continued to grow considerably, putting exist-
ing public services under pressure. Although plans al-
ready existed, it was only the new mayor, Luis Recoder
(Convergence and Union), who initiated the reorganisa-
tion of the local public administration after a narrow lo-
cal election win in 1999 in a context where the Catalan
Socialist Party increased its share of votes in the re-
gional elections while reinforcing its control over sur-
rounding cities. Despite the continuous electoral sup-
port giving Luis Recoder strong mandate, the local exec-
utive was not free from pressure. As the largest city gov-
erned by Convergence and Union, the executive team
felt pressure to showcase Convergence and Union poli-
cies and management (former mayor of Sant Cugat, per-
sonal communication).
As a response to Catalan Socialist Party’s growth in
the 1999 elections, the new mayor opted for the intro-
duction of a new organizationalmodel that distinguished
the political from themanagerial sphere. The newmodel
hinged upon the introduction of a city manager, a posi-
tion that had already been appointed by early adopters
pioneering the diffusion of a variation of the US city man-
ager system in the Catalan region. The new system was
deemed more modern and effective and it was intro-
duced because the new mayor wanted to signal his com-
mitment to high-quality governance. The first city man-
ager, Jordi Turull i Negre, was selected from the ranks of
senior civil servants who had been loyal to Convergence
andUnion. He had served in top positions under themay-
ors of Curb, Sant Vicenc de Castellet, and Sant Adrià de
Besòs. In 2004, he left the position of city manager in
Sant Cugat del Vallès when he became an elected mem-
ber of the Catalan Parliament.
The introduction of the city manager triggered a con-
flict with civil servants who regarded the new figure
as an additional layer of control and not as the coor-
dinator between the political and managerial spheres.
However, the relationship of mutual trust and collabo-
ration between the mayor and the city manager gradu-
ally overcame the civil servants’ opposition to the new
organizational model. By focusing on data collection
and evaluation of institutional performance for decision-
making purposes, the city manager actively signalled
that he wanted to minimize any intrusion into civil
servants’ affairs (economic deputy of Sant Cugat, per-
sonal communication).
The resignation of Jordi Turull i Negre did not
imply an interruption in the implementation process
of the new organizational model. Local elections in
2003 confirmed support for the incumbent mayor, Luis
Recoder, who appreciably increased his share of the
votes. Electoral results provided a further impetus for
the refinement of the organizational model under the
leadership of a new city manager. In 2004, the City coun-
cil set out to develop a Balanced Scorecard and strate-
gic planning (Plan Ciudad) as tools for improving the
communication between political executives and the ad-
ministrative structure. These tools were also used by
the city manager for allocating resources and manag-
ing programs. In 2005, Luis Recoder, together with the
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deputy for the economy Jordi Joly, decided to transform
theMunicipal Autonomous Agency for Tax Management
into the Institute of Strategic Management, Economic
Promotion and Information Society (IGEPESI). This new
institution would pilot innovation and reform of the
whole structure of the municipality (economic deputy
of Sant Cugat, personal communication; Turull i Negre
& Vivas Urieta, 2003). Since 2007 the Office of Strategic
Management of IGEPESI had worked on the definition
and development of a new system named Strategic
Alignment and Competitiveness Plan (PACTE). This plan
was based on the academic work being undertaken at
ESADE Business School, located nearby and renowned
for advanced studies in performance management:
Major changes were implemented during the admin-
istration of former Mayor Recoder. Luckily, we hired
very competent people fromESADE,whodesigned the
PACTE [Strategic Alignment andCompetitiveness Plan]
consisting of a council to plan policies with a clear rela-
tionship between objectives and costs but also a clear
division between political leadership and the expert
knowledge of municipal technicians. (Former mayor
of Sant Cugat, personal communication)
The Strategic Alignment and Competitiveness Plan was
implemented fully in 2008 and complemented the dual
organizational structure (Recoder & Joly, 2010). The
government also implemented an e-purchasing system
which streamlined the entire circuit of purchase, limited
the number of procedures, and increased control and
transparency in public procurement, a traditional risk
zone for corruption. The transparency of public procure-
ment was further strengthened under the leadership of
the new mayor Merce Conesa who succeeded the direc-
tion of the city in 2010. To increase scrutiny of procure-
ment processes, Conesa appointed representatives of
the opposition to the boards overseeing public procure-
ment (opposition leader of Sant Cugat, personal com-
munication). Further, Conesa finalized the consolidation
of the dual organizational structure and together with a
new city manager, she continued the performance man-
agement agenda and complemented it with the emerg-
ing open government paradigm focused on transparency
and digital innovation.
6. Conclusions
This article has focused on pockets of good government
at the subnational level in Spain.We put forward an argu-
ment based on the role of the fiduciary relationship be-
tweenmayors and citymanagers and specified the condi-
tions under which a trustee system can be implemented
successfully. We have illustrated our argument by track-
ing the path of institutional reform in two medium-sized
Spanish cities with a successful record of controlling cor-
ruption and above-average performance in transparency
and administrative capacity.
Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès have both fol-
lowed a remarkably similar reform sequence which dif-
fers from the path taken by similar cities in their regions.
Both cities implemented a dual organizational model
in which elected officials and administrators maintain
distinct roles: Political control involves the capacity to
set direction and oversee performance results, while im-
plementation is shaped by professional standards and
perspectives (Svara, 2001). The implementation of the
dual organizational model was carefully phased in over
a prolonged period in contexts marked by the sustained
support of executive leadership. In contexts where the
same actors had successively won elections, but lead-
ers foresaw possible future defeat, the dual organiza-
tional model was endorsed by incumbents to signal com-
petence and integrity, while government longevity pro-
vided sufficient time for consistent implementation. The
politicians’ endorsement of administrative reforms fos-
tered the sustained effort of city managers, who drew
on the expectation that administrative reforms should
be maintained. On the one hand, city managers estab-
lished a constructive relationshipwith the executive lead-
ership as they displayed a commitment to accountabil-
ity and responsiveness to political leaders. On the other
hand, city managers were able to overcome administra-
tors’ resistance to the implementation of the new orga-
nizational model by focusing on strategic planning and
performance evaluation.
Much remains to be done to generalize fromour case
studies that can only articulate issues for further investi-
gation about institutional reforms. In particular, this ar-
ticle contributes to the existing literature dealing with
the impact of political competition on the control of cor-
ruption by adding a relevant but still overlooked multi-
arena perspective. We show that political vulnerability
also originates from elections in units different from
those under investigation (regional elections and local
elections in surrounding municipalities). In both cases,
the isolation of the parties (Spanish Socialist Party and
Convergence and Union) in the region activated strong
electoral pressures even if a mayors’ grip on local gov-
ernment was stable. The mayors in regions dominated
by other parties felt constrained and focused on show-
casing their ability as good managers. The existence of
such pressures implies that political competition occur-
ring in the units of analysis is not capable of telling the
entire story and that multi-arena patterns might be im-
portant political determinants of institutional reforms.
Hence, the theories dealing with the effect of electoral
competition on institutional reforms should take into ac-
count the interaction between different electoral arenas
and its impact on reforms.
Further, our research contributes to the growing
body of literature on within-country variation observed
at the subnational level regarding the control of corrup-
tion (Erlingsson & Lundåsen, 2019). Against this back-
ground, it is a crucial task to understand the extent to
which local authorities may be responsible for producing
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variation within one country. We did this in Spain, a set-
ting with corruption problems, and did indeed find dif-
ferentiated paths of organizational change across munic-
ipalities. A fine-grained analysis of factors affecting insti-
tutional innovation at the individual level revealed that
two medium-sized cities experienced considerable im-
provements and benefited from the diffusion of cityman-
agers who were able to match political pressures for ser-
vice delivery to modern managerial solutions. Thus, our
findings highlight the relevance of qualitativemicro-level
analyses of public management reforms for the growing
literature on subnational variations in the quality of gov-
ernment in developed countries (Di Mascio & Natalini,
2013; Ongaro & Valotti, 2008). The micro-level approach
also serves as a bridge between different areas of inquiry,
as it resonates with the emerging literature on islands of
integrity in developing countries (McDonnell, 2017).
Finally, our findings have important policy implica-
tions as they affirm the relevance for local governments
of institutional innovations which, by design, create a
distance between the political and managerial spheres.
Our case-oriented research highlighted that successful
control of corruption begins with administrative reform.
Given the scarcity of organizational resources at the lo-
cal level of government, investment should first be di-
rected towards building capacity for strategic planning
and performance evaluation rather than being diverted
towards the implementation of the international anti-
corruption toolkit.
Acknowledgments
This article is the result of a common undertaking.
However, the Sections 4 and 5 can be directly attributed
to Eliška Drápalová; Sections 1, 2, 3 and 6 to Fabrizio
Di Mascio. The authors would like to thank Simona
Piattoni and Victor Lapuente for their comments and
valuable advice on the early versions of the article. The
authors are also grateful to the three anonymous review-
ers for their constructive comments to improve the qual-
ity of the manuscript.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Ashworth, R. E., McDermott, A. M., & Currie, G. (2019).
Theorizing from qualitative research in public admin-
istration: Plurality through a combination of rigor and
richness. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, 29(2), 318–333.
Bågenholm, A., & Charron, N. (2014). Do politics in Eu-
rope benefit from politicising corruption?West Euro-
pean Politics, 37(5), 903–931.
Bearfield, D., & Bowman, A. O. M. (2017). Can you
find it on the web? An assessment of municipal e-
government transparency. Administration & Society,
47(2), 172–188.
Beeri, I., & Navot, D. (2013). Local political corruption:
Potential structural malfunctions at the central-local,
local-local and intra-local levels. Public Management
Review, 15(5), 712–739.
Benito, B., Guillamón, M.-D., & Bastida, F. (2015). Deter-
minants of urban political corruption in local govern-
ments. Crime, Law and Social Change, 63, 191–210.
Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (2014). Process tracing: From
metaphor to analytic tool. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Berliner, D. (2014). The political origins of transparency.
The Journal of Politics, 76(2), 479–491.
Berliner, D., & Erlich, A. (2015). Competing for trans-
parency: Political competition and institutional re-
form inMexican states. American Political Science Re-
view, 109(1), 110–128.
Broms, R., Dahlström, C., & Fazekas, M. (2019). Politi-
cal competition and public procurement outcomes.
Comparative Political Studies, 52(9), 1259–1292.
Charron, N., Lapuente, V., & Annoni, P. (2019). Measur-
ing quality of government in EU regions across space
and time. Papers in Regional Science. https://doi.org/
10.1111/pirs.12437
Coviello, D., & Gagliarducci, S. (2017). Tenure in office
and public procurement.American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 9(3), 59–105.
Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2017). Organizing
Leviathan: Politicians, bureaucrats, and the mak-
ing of good government. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J. (2012). Public
administration around the world. In S. Holmberg &
B. Rothstein (Eds.), Good government: The relevance
of political science (pp. 40–68). Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
de Sousa, L., Hindess, B., & Larmour, P. (2009). Govern-
ments, NGOs and anti-corruption: The new integrity
warriors. London: Routledge.
Di Mascio, F., & Natalini, A. (2013). Context and mech-
anisms in administrative reform processes: Perfor-
mance management within Italian local government.
International Public Management Journal, 16(1),
141–166.
Dowding, K. M., & Kimber, R. (1983). The meaning and
use of ‘political stability.’ European Journal of Politi-
cal Research, 11(3), 229–243.
Drapalova, E., & Lapuente, V. (2017). Do city managers
improve government performance? Analysis of the ef-
fect of city managers in Catalanmunicipalities? (QoG
Institute Working Papers 2017:2). Gothenburg: Uni-
versity of Gothenburg.
Erlingsson, G. Ó., & Lundåsen, S. W. (2019). When
state-level institutions cannot tell the whole story:
An inquiry into municipal variations in quality of
government. Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/
gove.12463
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 136
Esteller-Moré, A., & Polo Otero, J. (2012). Fiscal
transparency: (Why) does your local government
respond? Public Management Review, 14(8),
1153–1173.
European Commission. (2014). EUanti-corruption report:
Spain (COM(2014) 38 final, Annex 9). Brussels: Euro-
pean Commission.
Fay, D. L., & Zavattaro, S. M. (2019). Contracting, ethics,
and policy adoption: The case of Florida municipali-
ties. Public Integrity, 21(3), 201–319.
Fernandez, A. (2013). El proceso de gerencialización
del Ayuntamiento de Barcelona: Aspectos teóricos
y pràcticos [The process of managerial reform in
the Barcelona City Hall: Theoretical and practical
aspects] (Working Paper University of Barcelona
No. 314). Barcelona: University of Barcelona.
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and the-
ory development in the social sciences. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Grzymała-Busse, A. M. (2007). Rebuilding Leviathan:
Party competition and state exploitation in post-
communist democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Hagemann, C. (2019). How politics matters for EU funds’
absorption problems: A fuzzy-set analysis. Journal of
European Public Policy, 26(2), 188–206.
Heywood, P. M. (2017). Rethinking corruption: Hocus-
pocus, locus and focus. The Slavonic and East Euro-
pean Review, 95(1), 21–48.
Iglesias Alonso, Á. I. (2006). Gobernanza e innovación
en la gestión pública: Alcobendas 1979–2003 [Gov-
ernance and innovation in public management: Al-
cobendas 1979–2003]. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de
Administración Pública.
Iglesias Alonso, Á. I., & Villoria, M. (2010). Local politi-
cal leadership in urban governance and public admin-
istration modernisation: The role of the mayor and
councillors in a Spanishmunicipality. Lex Localis, 8(2),
185–201.
InfoParticipa. (2017). Calidad y transparencia de la comu-
nicación pública [Quality and transparency of public
communication].Mapa InfoParticipa.Retrieved from
http://www.mapainfoparticipa.com/index/mapa
Jiménez, F. (2009). Building boom and political corrup-
tion in Spain. South European Society and Politics,
14(3), 255-272.
Jiménez, F., Quesada-Garcia, M., & Villoria, M. (2014).
Explaining differences in the extent of corruption in
three Spanish local governments. International Jour-
nal of Public Administration, 37(1), 67–82.
Jiménez, F., Villoria, M., & Quesada-Garcia, M. (2012).
Badly designed institutions, informal rules and per-
verse incentives: Local government corruption in
Spain. Lex Localis, 10(4), 363–381.
Jiménez, F., Villoria, M., & Romero, J. (2012).
(Un)sustainable territories: Causes of the specu-
lative bubble in Spain (1996−2010) and its territorial,
environmental and socio-political consequences.
Environment and Planning Government and Policy,
30, 467–486.
Klausen, K. K., & Magnier, A. (1998). The anonymous
leader: Appointed CEOs inWestern local government.
Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark.
Knott, J. H., & Miller, G. J. (2008). When ambition checks
ambition: Bureaucratic trustees and the separation
of powers. The American Review of Public Adminis-
tration, 38(4), 387–411.
Majone, G. (2001). Two logics of delegation: Agency and
fiduciary relationships in EU governance. European
Union Politics, 2(1), 103–122.
Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2018). Grappling with
the ‘real politics’ of systemic corruption: Theoretical
debates versus ‘real-world’ functions. Governance,
31(3), 499–514.
Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2019). Thinking politically
about corruption as problem-solving: A reply to
Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell. Governance, 32(4),
811–820.
Martín, V. O. M., & Darias, L. M. J. (2011). La corrupción
urbanística, la crisis actual y el atraso de España: El
papel de la renta del suelo [Urban corruption, the cur-
rent crisis and the backwardness of Spain]. Madrid:
EAE Editorial Academia Española.
McDonnell, E. M. (2017). Patchwork Leviathan: How
pockets of bureaucratic governance flourish within
institutionally diverse developing states. American
Sociological Review, 82(3), 476–510.
Mele, V., & Ongaro, E. (2014). Public sector reform in a
context of political instability: Italy 1992–2007. Inter-
national Public Management Journal, 17(1), 111–142.
Milio, S. (2008). How political stability shapes adminis-
trative performance: The Italian case.West European
Politics, 31(5), 915–936.
Miller, G. J., & Whitford, A. B. (2016). Above politics: Bu-
reaucratic discretion and credible commitment. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Ministry of Finance of Spain. (2017). Data bank. Data
bank. Retrieved from http://buscadorcdi.gob.es/
Cifra/en/inicio
Mitchell, D. (2018). City managers and the implemen-
tation of strategic initiatives. Public Administration,
96(1), 200–217.
Mouritzen, P. E., & Svara, J. H. (2012). Leadership at the
apex: Politicians and administrators in Western local
governments. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The quest for good gover-
nance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A., & Dadašov, R. (2016).Measuring con-
trol of corruption by a new index of public integrity.
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,
22(3), 415–438.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A., & Dadašov, R. (2017). When do an-
ticorruption laws matter? The evidence on public
integrity enabling contexts. Crime, Law and Social
Change, 68, 387–402.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 137
Nalbandian, J. (2006). Politics and administration in local
government. International Journal of Public Adminis-
tration, 29(12), 1049–1063.
Nelson, K. L., & Svara, J. H. (2015). The roles of local gov-
ernment managers in theory and practice: A centen-
nial perspective. Public Administration Review, 75(1),
49–61.
Ongaro, E., & Valotti, G. (2008). Public management re-
form in Italy: Explaining the implementation gap. The
International Journal of Public Sector Management,
21(2), 174–204.
Ospina, S.M., Esteve,M., & Lee, S. (2017). Assessing qual-
itative studies in public administration research. Pub-
lic Administration Review, 78(4), 593–605.
Palacios, J. L., Fulgueiras, F. J., & Catalina, C. (2002).
La medición de la calidad en la administración lo-
cal: El caso de los servicios socioculturales del Ayun-
tamiento de Alcobendas [Measuring quality of local
administration: The case of the sociocultural services
in Alcobendas]. Dirección y Organización, 28. Re-
trieved from https://ww.revistadyo.com/index.php/
dyo/article/view/168
Parrado, S., Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2018). May-
ors and corruption in Spain: Same rules, different out-
comes. South European Society and Politics, 23(3),
303–322.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anti-
corruption reforms fail: Systemic corruption as a col-
lective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2019). Getting the
basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to
Marquette and Peiffer. Governance, 32(4), 799–810.
Piattoni, S., & Smyrl, M. (2002). Building effective insti-
tutions: Italian regions and EU structural funds. In J.
Bukowski, S. Piattoni, & M. Smyrl (Eds.), Between Eu-
ropeanization and local societies: The space for terri-
torial governance in Europe (pp. 133–156). Boulder,
CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pollitt, C. (2008). Time, policy, management: Governing
with the past. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2014). Public management
reform: A comparative analysis. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Ramió, C., & Salvador, M. (2012). Provisión de servicios
públicos en el contexto de la administración local
de España: El papel de los factores políticos institu-
cionales y la externalización de los gobiernos locales
[Provision of public services in the context of the local
administration: The role of political factors and the
outsourcing of local governments]. Gestión Y Política
Pública, 21(2), 375–405.
Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic struc-
ture and bureaucratic performance in less developed
countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75, 49–71.
Recoder, L., & Joly, J. (2010). La política que ve: Compet-
itividad pública per afrontar els reptes del segle XXI
[Real impact of politics: Public competitiveness to
face the challenges of the 21st century]. Barcelona:
Proa and La Mirada.
Rubin, E. V., & Baker, K. P. (2019). Paying attention to
the trees in the forest, or a call to examine agency-
specific stories. Review of Public Personnel Adminis-
tration, 39(4), 532–543.
Salvador, M., & Pano, E. (2018). Mayors facing local
Government reforms: From municipal organization
leadership to public management transformation
processes. Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 46,
103–127.
Sampson, S. (2010). The anticorruption industry: From
movement to institution. Global Crime, 11(2),
261–278.
Sancino, A., & Turrini, A. (2009). The managerial work
of Italian city managers: An empirical analysis. Local
Government Studies, 35(4), 475–491.
Schnell, S. (2018). Cheap talk or incredible commitment?
(Mis)calculating transparency and anti-corruption.
Governance, 31(3), 415–430.
Snyder, R. (2001). Scaling down: The subnational compar-
ative method. Studies in Comparative International
Development, 36(1), 93–110.
Svara, J. H. (2001). The myth of dichotomy: Complemen-
tarity of politics and administration in the past and fu-
ture of public administration. Public Administration
Review, 61(2), 176–183.
Sweeting, D. (2012). Analysing local political manage-
ment in Spain. Local Government Studies, 38(2),
231–247.
Tavares, A., & da Cruz, N. (2017). Explaining the trans-
parency of local government websites through a
political market framework. Government Informa-
tion Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2017.
08.005
Tejedo-Romero, F., & Araujo, J. F. (2020). E-government-
enabled transparency: The effect of electoral aspects
and citizen’s access to Internet on information disclo-
sure. Journal of Information Technology and Politics.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2020.1713958
Turull i Negre, J., & Vivas Urieta, C. (2003). El cuadro de
mando integral en la administración pública: El caso
del Ayuntamiento de Sant Cugat del Vallès [The bal-
anced scorecard in public administration: The case of
the Sant Cugat del Vallès]. Paper presented at the VIII
International Congress of CLAD on State Reform and
Public Administration, Panama.
van Dorp, E. J. (2018). Trapped in hierarchy: The craft
of Dutch city managers. Public Management Review,
20(8), 1228–1245.
Villoria, M. (2020). Corruption and transparency. In D.
Muro & I. Lago (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Span-
ish politics (pp. 629–645). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Wollmann, H. (2012). Local government reforms in
(seven) European countries: Between convergent
and divergent, conflicting and complementary devel-
opments. Local Government Studies, 38(1), 41–70.
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case study research: Design and meth-
ods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 138
About the Authors
Eliška Drápalová is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Gothenburg at the Quality of Governance
Institute. Her research focuses on administrative capacity, subnational quality of government, corrup-
tion, the effect of party competition on public services, and bureaucratic quality.
Fabrizio DiMascio is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Turin. His comparative
research focuses on public management reform, open government, and regulatory governance.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 139
